Yes, I read that article too. I can't remember the link to the source site offhand.
However - there were rational reasons for that setting. Of course, it was presented in a 'Thou, Gentle Reader, shall be Shocked, Truly Shocked' manner. Remember that the guys who wrote it have a political agenda, too.
The 8-digit unlock code safeguard was implemented as an additional layer of security to guard against specific threats. Mostly to minimise risk from within the 'trusted' group of missile controller officers. It was bypassed in an environment where the prevailing military attitude was one of time-critical response requirements, which always has a bearing on security system design. No doubt those who quietly decided to ignore that particular security measure felt that they had good reasons for doing so. I got the impression that it was originally introduced as a political initiative, rather than as anything that came out of a holistic security design exercise.
I found it particularly interesting to read in another article by the same author that the 'understood by the brass, but not the politicians' military facts of the Cold War, from the USA's perspective, were that 'retaliatory strike after attack' was impossible.
Even though second-strike retaliatory deterrence was the policy of the administration at the time, the real position was always 'retaliatory strike upon launch warning'. Strike capabilities after absorbing a full-scale nuclear assault from the USSR could not be guaranteed, hence it was imperative that a retaliatory strike was launched while the Russian missiles were still in the air. Hence the military obsession with quick time-to-launch.
This is why there was always so much fervour surrounding the reliability of the early-warning systems, and the possibility of a single rogue launch triggering an all-out exchange. Neither side could afford to 'wait and see'.
kiwibiker is full of love, an disrespect.
- mikey
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