Somalia pirates taking ships- where was the on-board security?

[Swoop]

Solving The Somali Pirate Mess
November 19, 2008: The recent pirate attack on a 1,800 foot long, 300,000 ton tanker 700 kilometers off the Somali coast, has raised the stakes in the battle with the Somali pirates. The piracy has been a growing problem off the Somali coast for over a decade. The problem now is that there are hundreds of experienced pirates. And these guys have worked out a system that is very lucrative, and not very risky.

For most of the past decade, the pirates preyed on foreign fishing boats and the small, often sail powered, cargo boats the move close (within a hundred kilometers) of the shore. During that time, the pirates developed contacts with businessmen in the Persian Gulf who could be used to negotiate (for a percentage) the ransoms with insurance companies and shipping firms. The pirates also mastered the skills needed to put a grappling hook on the railing, 30-40 feet above the water, of a large ship. Doing this at night, and then scrambling aboard, is more dangerous if the ship has lookouts, who can alert sailors trained to deploy high pressure fire hoses against the borders.

Few big ships carry any weapons, and most have small crews (12-30 sailors). Attacking at night finds most of the crew asleep. Rarely do these ships have any armed security. Ships can post additional lookouts when in areas believed to have pirates. Once pirates (speedboats full of armed men) are spotted, ships can increase speed (a large ship running at full speed, about 40+ kilometers an hour, can outrun most of the current speed boats the pirates have), and have fire hoses ready to be used to repel boarders. The pirates will fire their AK-47 assault rifles and RPG grenade launchers, but the sailors handling the fire hoses will stand back so the gunmen cannot get a direct shot.

Since the pirates take good care of their captives, the anti-piracy efforts cannot risk a high body count, lest they be accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes or simply bad behavior. The pirates have access to hundreds of sea going fishing boats, which can pretend to fish by day, and sneak up on merchant ships at night. The pirates often operate in teams, with one or more fishing boats acting as lookouts, and alerting another boat that a large, apparently unguarded, ship is headed their way. The pirate captain can do a simple calculation to arrange meeting the oncoming merchant vessel in the middle of the night. These fishing boats can carry inflatable boats with large outboard engines. Each of these can carry four or five pirates, their weapons and the grappling hook projectors needed to get the pirates onto the deck of a large ship. These big ships are very automated, and at night the only people on duty will be on the bridge. This is where the pirates go, to seize control of the ship. The rest of the crew is then rounded up. The pirates force the captain to take the ship to an anchorage near some Somali fishing village. There, more gunmen will board, and stand guard over crew and ship until the ransom is paid. Sometimes, part of the crew will be sent ashore, and kept captive there. The captive sailors are basically human shields for the pirates, to afford some protection from commando attacks.

Now that the pirates have demonstrated their ability to operate far (over 700 kilometers) from shore, it's no longer possible to use naval patrols. There is simply too much area to patrol. What the naval commanders are considering is a convoy system for any ships passing within a thousand kilometers of the Somali coast. But with ocean going ships, the pirates can operate anywhere in the region. Between the Gulf of Aden, and the Straits of Malacca to the east (between Singapore and Indonesia), you have a third of the worlds shipping. All are now at risk. Convoys for all these ships would require more warships (over a hundred) than can be obtained.

That leaves the option of a military operation to capture the seaside towns and villages the pirates operate from. This would include sinking hundreds of fishing boats and speedboats. Hundreds of civilians would be killed or injured. Unless the coastal areas were occupied (or until local Somalis could maintain law and order), the pirates would soon be back in business.

Pacifying Somalia is an unpopular prospect. Given the opprobrium heaped on the U.S. for doing something about Iraq, no one wants to be on the receiving end of that criticism for pacifying Somalia. The world also knows, from over a century of experience, that the Somalis are violent, persistent and unreliable. That's a combination that has made it impossible for the Somalis to even govern themselves. In the past, what is now Somalia has been ruled, by local and foreign rulers, through the use of violent methods that are no longer politically acceptable. But now the world is caught between accepting a "piracy tax" imposed by the Somalis, or going in and pacifying the unruly country and its multitude of bandits, warlords and pirates.

The piracy tax is basically a security surcharge on maritime freight movements. It pays for higher insurance premiums (which in turn pay for the pirate ransoms), danger bonuses for crews and the additional expense of all those warships off the Somali coast. Most consumers would hardly notice this surcharge, as it would increase sea freight charges by less than a percent. Already, many ships are going round the southern tip of Africa, and avoiding Somalia and the Suez canal altogether. Ships would still be taken. Indeed, about a third of the ships seized this year had taken precautions, but the pirates still got them. Warships could attempt an embargo of Somalia, not allowing seagoing ships in or our without a warship escort. Suspicious seagoing ships, and even speedboats, could be sunk in port. That would still produce some videos (real or staged, it doesn't matter) of dead civilians, but probably not so many that the anti-piracy force would be indicted as war criminals.

On the plus side, illegal fishing in Somali waters would diminish, because of the pirate threat. Suez canal traffic in the Gulf of Aden would get used to waiting for a convoy to form at either end of the 1,500 kilometers long route through pirate territory. There would still be enough ship captains stupid or impatient enough to make the "Aden Run" alone, and get caught by the pirates. The UN, and the heads of major world navies, would continue to agitate for a large peacekeeping force to go in. The UN because of the growing casualties among its food aid staff, and the admirals because of the toll of keeping nearly a hundred of warships and patrol aircraft stationed off Somalia in the endless anti-piracy patrol. Eventually, public opinion might lean towards pacification, rather than the endless anti-pirate patrol. Eventually, maybe. But for now the piracy is definitely there, and will grow larger if nothing decisive is done. Which is what has already been happening, and may continue to happen.

[FJRider]

And when a problem (pirates), in one area is "taken care of"... the problem moves to another area. And the cycle continues...

On the plus side, the Indian navy reportedly sunk a pirate mother ship... lets see how that pans out in the great scheme of "pirate activity"

[Paul in NZ]

And when a problem (pirates), in one area is "taken care of"... the problem moves to another area. And the cycle continues...

On the plus side, the Indian navy reportedly sunk a pirate mother ship... lets see how that pans out in the great scheme of "pirate activity"

Drat........

http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/ov/ar...e-pirates.aspx

[Ixion]

Irrelevant. The ship was in the control of pirates and opened fire upon the INS vessel. Traditionally it was common for pirates to take over ships they had captured.

The deaths of the (captured) crew are regrettable, but in such activities some collateral damage must be expected. Anything that opens fire on a King's ship is fair game.

[Swoop]

November 27, 2008: There's a gold rush atmosphere on northern Somalia's "pirate coast." More gangs are being formed, and going hunting. The gangs have an informal organization, which largely consists of not getting into each others' way. The local government of Puntland (a tribal coalition that had brought peace to this corner of the country) has been bought off and intimidated into inaction. The local Islamic Courts gunmen are not numerous, but have declared the taking of ships owned by Moslems to be bad. Plundering infidel ships is another matter, which the Islamic radicals are rather more vague on.

What it comes down to is that the piracy will continue and grow until the pirates no longer have bases. Nothing new about this. Similar piracy situations have arisen for thousands of years, and have been eliminated the same way; you go after the bases. But no one wants to step forward and do this. In the past this was less of a problem, because there was no mass media quick to find fault with any government action. But there's also the nature of the enemy. The Somalis have been a regional menace for centuries, raiding and threatening neighbors with all manner of mayhem. The Somalis are persistent and resourceful fighters. British 19th century colonial administrators learned that the best way to deal with Somali outlaws was to "shoot on sight, shoot first, shoot to kill, keep shooting." Not unexpectedly, post-colonial Somalia proved unable to govern itself. The tribal rivalries kept the pot boiling, and even the rise of a "clean government" party (the Islamic Courts), based on installing a religious dictatorship, backfired. Too many Somalis were willing to fight the Islamic radicals, who were also handicapped by their support for al Qaeda and international Islamic terrorism.

In the past (before the European colonialists showed up) a form of order was imposed by having more reasonable (and often non-Somali) powers hold the coastal cities and towns, enabling trade with the outside world. One had to accept a near constant state of war, or just the banditry, with the interior tribes. There were periods of peace, as warlords established temporary kingdoms, but was never the notion that peace was something that would last. The Somalis were constantly at war with their neighbors, usually in the form of Somalis raiding into Kenya and Ethiopia, and sometimes getting attacked in turn by "punitive raids" (to discourage raiding, for a while anyway.)

Local Arab and African governments are looking to the West (the owners of most of the ships being plundered) to deal with the problem. The West is looking to the United States to take the lead. The U.S. got burned (by the Somalis and the mass media) the last time (1993) it tried to bring peace to Somalia. What will happen now is all these nations will squabble among themselves over who will do the deed, until the piracy gets so bad that someone blinks. Egypt is particularly nervous, as major ships are starting to avoid the Gulf of Aden, and the Suez canal. This could eventually deprive Egypt of millions of dollars a day in canal transit fees. It will cost shipping companies even more to send their slower and more vulnerable (to pirates) ships around the southern tip of Africa. But what will really bring in the marines (U.S. or otherwise) will be greedy pirates to pull more stunts like going after the huge tankers entering and leaving the Persian Gulf. This trade is vital to international commerce and the world economy. Put too much hurt on the big money, and the big stick comes out. The media have their irresistible wartime headlines, Somalia has some form of peace, and a decrease in population. The Somalis don't fight like the Iraqis or Afghans (who don't fight like each other either). The Somalis have shorter fuses, and come at you with more vigor and determination. They are not really difficult to defeat, but it's messy. The Somalis like making war a family affair, and will use civilians as human shields. They have embraced the use of suicide bombers, roadside bombs and all manner of modern Moslem mayhem. Short of some unprecedented national attitude adjustment, the Somalis will continue being difficult and deadly to deal with.

The Islamic radical groups now control most of Somalia south of Mogadishu. The Transitional National Government (TNG) keeps trying to achieve a compromise deal to unite most of the tribes (called clans here), but compromise is not a popular thing in Somalia, nor is trust. The Islamic radicals have popular appeal among the tribes, because the radicals are the least corrupt and capricious armed group in the country. But the Islamic radicals also try to impose strict lifestyle rules on everyone, and that is not popular. Thus the very peace that the Islamic radicals bring with them, is quickly undermined by the actions of the "lifestyle police" the radicals unleash. More moderate Islamic radicals could easily take over the country. But the problem with Islamic radicalism is there is always a competition among factions to be more radical than thou. This leads to internal strife and collapse of the movement. Then there's always the tribal politics, and the inability of tribal and warlord groups to compromise to form a united government. Not enough Somali leaders have accepted the fact that the old ways just are not working. Then again, many Somalis have a different concept of peace and prosperity. In times past, the losers in these tribal wars would all die, or be absorbed into the victorious tribe. But these days you have international relief efforts. So two million Somalis are surviving on foreign aid. This refugee community produces more angry young men, ready to take up the gun and go get some tribal justice, or just get rich.

The UN is trying to make an arms embargo in Somalia work. The UN has authorized the use of asset freezes and travel restrictions against gunrunners. This has not worked in the past, and will probably not work now. With the Ethiopians leaving Mogadishu by the end of the year, it's going to be the UN and AU (African Union) trying to maintain some form of order in the city. The UN is also under pressure to authorize a naval blockade of Somalia. This would be difficult and expensive to carry out, what with a 3,000 kilometer coastline, and lots of determined pirates. The blockade would have to be maintained (and paid for) "indefinitely", or until someone went in and imposed peace on the country. NATO has flat out refused to consider helping out with a blockade.

November 26, 2008: Up north in Puntland, bandits kidnapped two British journalists, and held them for ransom. Three other foreign journalists are being held in Mogadishu. Somali bandits are trying to get ransoms of half a million dollars or more for each of these reporters.

November 22, 2008: A small (several dozen gunmen) group of Islamic radicals announced that they would find those responsible for seizing the Saudi owned tanker, and punish the pirates for attacking Moslems. The Islamic radicals made a show of driving around Puntland waving their guns and shouting slogans. But with a potential ransom of over $10 million, the Saudi tanker is well guarded by even more determined Somalis.

November 21, 2008: Pirates released a chemical tanker, and its crew of 19, after two months of captivity. Apparently a ransom (of over two million dollars in cash) had been paid.

November 19, 2008: As of today, the pirates have seized nine ships in twelve days. One of those ships, a Thai fishing trawler, fishing illegally in Somali waters, was approached by an Indian frigate shortly after the pirates took over. The pirates fired on the Indian warship, which returned fire and destroyed the trawler. Apparently most of the pirates and trawler crew were killed. It took a several days for it to become clear that the Indians had not destroyed a pirate "mother ship", but a recently captured fishing boat. These craft are often used as mother ships, but only after the original crews are disposed of (ransomed or murdered). The pirates prefer to collect ransom on these large fishing boats, and believe they are acting as an informal "coast guard", and halting illegal fishing, by doing so. The pirates consider the ransom for fishing boats to be "fines", and that foreign warships have no right to interfere with this coast guard business.

[Ixion]

What it comes down to is that the piracy will continue and grow until the pirates no longer have bases. Nothing new about this. Similar piracy situations have arisen for thousands of years, and have been eliminated the same way; you go after the bases. But no one wants to step forward and do this.

Yep. Again. Repeat again.

Warship offshore, bombard. Or, cruise scallops (I don't like mussels). Or , let the Marines (Royal or US, either are competent) loose on them.

Destroy the bases. Destroy the houses, wharves, installations. Shoot everything that moves . Move onto the next base.

It will make the Somali young men even angrier you say? Big deal. If they get angry, shoot them.



Sorted.

[Paul in NZ]

It will make the Somali young men even angrier you say? Big deal. If they get angry, shoot them.Sorted.

And continue to shoot them until they calm down or get taxi licenses I say

[Ixion]

Pretty much. Dunno that I'd rely too much on calming down though. Nothin' says luvin' like a burst of AK47.

[Paul in NZ]

Pretty much. Dunno that I'd rely too much on calming down though. Nothin' says luvin' like a burst of AK47.

Send in the blackhawks - oh - um - other hawks then.. (hollywood needs a new script)

[Winston001]

In the past (before the European colonialists showed up) a form of order was imposed by having more reasonable (and often non-Somali) powers hold the coastal cities and towns, enabling trade with the outside world. One had to accept a near constant state of war, or just the banditry, with the interior tribes. There were periods of peace, as warlords established temporary kingdoms, but was never the notion that peace was something that would last. The Somalis were constantly at war with their neighbors, usually in the form of Somalis raiding into Kenya and Ethiopia, and sometimes getting attacked in turn by "punitive raids" (to discourage raiding, for a while anyway.)

Another great post Swoop, very informative.

Herein lies the problem - a culture of confict. Now where else has the West come across that........and lost? Afghanistan. We should probably add northern Pakistan too.

In the past this culture was localised and didn't impact on the outer world. Now with modern weapons it's getting a lot harder to ignore. The Afghanistani warlords haven't gone away or become trustworthy, neither will that happen in Somalia any time soon.

It will be interesting to see where this piracy problem goes. If the EU won't attack the bases it's hard to see why the US should. That invites China to step in as a white knight and I doubt they would be pussyfooted about it.

India would consider that a vast insult into its area of influence so might just do the job instead.......

[Swoop]

India would consider that a vast insult into its area of influence so might just do the job instead.......

India has just spent $4Billion on the purchase and refurbisment/modernisation of the ex Russian Navy fleet carrier.
They are also spending $800 Million on aicraft for her deck...

Coupled with the lease arrangement of the Akula II class submarine, India is getting set up to look after her own ocean, quite effectively.

[Swoop]

Russia is planning to send more warships to the Somali coast, along with some commandos and a particularly Russian style of counter-piracy operations. In other words, the Russians plan to go old school on the Somali pirates, and use force to rescue ships currently held, and act ruthlessly against real or suspected pirates it encounters at sea.

This could cause diplomatic problems with the other nations providing warships for counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast. That's because the current ships have, so far, followed a policy of not attempting rescue operations (lest captive sailors get hurt) and not firing on pirates unless fired on first. Russia believes this approach only encourages the pirates.

Russia is planning on bringing along commandos from Spetsgruppa Vympel. These are hostage rescue experts, formed two decades ago as a spinoff from the original Russian army Spetsnaz commandos. This came about when various organizations in the Soviet government decided that they could use a few Spetsnaz type troops for their own special needs. Thus in the 1970s and 80s there appeared Spetsnaz clones called Spetsgruppa. The most use of these was Spetsgruppa Alfa (Special Group A), which was established in 1974 to do the same peacetime work as the U.S. Delta Force or British SAS. In other words; anti-terrorist assignments or special raids. It was Spetsgruppa Alfa that was sent to Kabul, Afghanistan, in 1980 to make sure the troublesome Afghan president Amin and his family were eliminated from the scene (killed). Survivors (members of the presidential palace staff) of the Spetsgruppa Alfa assault reported that the Spetsnaz troopers systematically hunted down and killed their targets with a minimum of fuss. Very professional. The surviving Afghans were suitably impressed. Spetsgruppa Alfa now belongs to the FSB (successor to the KGB) and number about 300 men (and a few women.) At the same time Spetsgruppa Alfa was established, another section of the KGB organized Spetsgruppa Vympel. This group was trained to perform wartime assassination and kidnapping jobs for the KGB. The FSB also inherited Spetsgruppa Vympel, which is a little smaller than Spetsgruppa Alpha and is used mainly for hostage rescue.

[Ixion]

Ah. As I said earlier, the problem will soon be over. Mr Putin will sort it. The only western leader with balls.

[Swoop]

Over the last decade, the Somali pirates have developed an infrastructure of agents and advisors that enable them to negotiate large ransoms for hijacked ships. The pirates themselves belong to about half a dozen gangs, which are based in towns on Somalia's northern coast. This is safely away from the Islamic radical ("Islamic Courts") warlords further south. The Islamic Courts have threatened to shut down the pirates, mainly because all those foreign warships off the coast interfere with terrorist activities the Islamic radicals support.

The gunmen who work for the pirate chiefs get paid enough to just get by, and the big money is made if you manage to capture a ship. A dozen or more pirates usually go out on a larger boat (a captured fishing boat) with two or more speed boats in tow, seeking a ship to hijack. Sometimes, several of these larger boats will cooperate to track down and grab a large merchant ship. If a crew is successful in grabbing a ship (and most of these trips, which can last several days, are not), they then bring the ship back to the north coast and drop anchor near the town that is their base. Their boss will arrange for the crew of the hijacked ship to be cared for (either on the ship or ashore) and assign more pirates to guard the ship and crew.

The pirate chief will also bring in an experienced negotiator. These are usually local businessmen, who have developed the proper connections and knowledge over the past decade. Contacting the shipping company that owns the captured vessel is easy, as the ship itself has the contact information, and satellite phones on which to make the call. Most, if not all, of the negotiators have business connections in the Persian Gulf, and this has sometimes come into play during haggling for the ransom, and making arrangements for payment.

The ship owner calls in the insurance company, which then engages professional negotiators. The insurance company and the shipping company will spend $300-500,000 on negotiators, lawyers and cash transportation specialists to carry out the deal. Of late, the negotiations have taken about two months, and a ransom of one or two million is usually paid. This tends to be delivered, in cash, usually via a well armed tugboat coming north from Kenya (where ports like Mombassa have banks that can supply the required amount of currency, usually, per the pirates request, in used, but recent, $50 and $100 notes). The armed cash escorts bring the money to the ship, the pirates haul it ($2 million in hundreds weighs less than 30 pounds) aboard, count it, then leave with their loot. At that point, some of the armed escorts stay with the ship as the crew fires up its engines and gets them away from Somalia.

The ransom is usually divided according to a previously agreed on formula of shares. This is how pirates have done it for centuries. The pirate chief often gets about half the ransom, and takes care of most expenses out of that share. The pirates don't begrudge the boss his half, because the pirate gang is kept together by this guy, and his personal stash of cash. The pirates who actually took the ship, and the negotiator, get shares that can amount to five percent (or more) of the ransom per man. For a two million dollar ransom, that's $100,000 per man. This is a fortune in this part of the world. You can buy a nice new house, take a wife (or another wife), buy a fishing boat or shop and, basically, be set for life. This payout, in cash, encourages the other pirates in the gang, and everyone in the neighborhood. Parties are usually thrown, and a good time is had by all. Meanwhile, the insurance companies plan their next rate hike for ships that feel they must travel near the Somali coast.

[vifferman]

The pirates themselves belong to about half a dozen gangs, which are based in towns on Somalia's northern coast. This is safely away from the Islamic radical ("Islamic Courts") warlords further south. The Islamic Courts have threatened to shut down the pirates, mainly because all those foreign warships off the coast interfere with terrorist activities the Islamic radicals support.

Apparently not far distant enough to be "safely away"; there was an article in The Harold recently about the warlords paying the pirates a visit. It wasn't really clear from the article if their point was to say, "Pull your heads in and stop it!" or "Give us some of the loot!" Perhaps a bit of both, or maybe it was just a bit of macho posturing?